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Abstract Although the charter of the North American Free Trade Agreement established a 
schedule that would have opened the border states of the United States to competition from 
Mexican trucking companies in 1995, and all of the United States to this competition in 2000, the 
full implementation of these provisions has been delayed due to concerns about the safety of 
Mexican trucks and drivers.  This delay has resulted in much frustration for Mexico, which, in 
2009 implemented retaliatory tariffs on products imported from the United States.  In March, 
2011 the two countries unveiled a deal to resolve this dispute which could help ease tense 
relations between the two neighbors.  This paper discusses the nature and significance of the 
trucking dispute between Mexico and the United States.   
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1.  Introduction 
 
The economic ties between Mexico and the United States are of importance to policymakers 
because Mexico borders the United States and because of the significant economic links 
connecting the two countries.  It is also of strategic importance for the United States to have a 
prosperous, democratic, and friendly Mexico as a neighbor.  Mexico is the United States’ third 
largest trading partner, after Canada and China, while the United States is Mexico’s largest 
trading partner.  Trucks carry about 80 percent of the cargo, by value, from the United States to 
Mexico, and vice versa.    
 
The United States and Mexico have had substantial economic connections through the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which began in 1994.  Before NAFTA, Mexico 
used the economic policy of import substitution, in which it attempted to grow certain domestic 
industries through trade protection.  An example is Mexico’s automobile industry, which was 
heavily regulated by the Mexican government from the 1960s to 1990.  The  government 
imposed import tariffs up to 25 percent on automotive products and levied restrictions on foreign 
automobile production in Mexico.  However, Mexico’s protectionist policies did not yield the 
expected positive results on economic growth, and so the country moved toward a policy of 
economic deregulation. 
 
The enactment of NAFTA was an important step in Mexico’s adopting freer trade policies, as 
were its efforts to privatize some of its state industries.  Since the early 1990s, Mexico’s trade 
policy has been among the most open in the world.  By early 2011, Mexico had entered into a 
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total of twelve free trade agreements involving forty-two countries.   Most studies conclude that 
the overall economic effects of NAFTA on Mexico (and the United States) have been small but 
positive, although some sectors in both countries have encountered adjustment burdens. 
(Lederman, et. al, 2002)  
 
Prior to NAFTA, the United States used two different trucking policies when dealing with 
Canada and Mexico.  The United States allowed Canadian cargo trucks to enter through its 
borders, largely because U.S. truckers were allowed to deliver cargo to Canada.  Yet the United 
States prevented Mexican truckers from obtaining operating licenses in the United States.  
However, Mexican trucks destined for Canada were allowed to travel through the United States 
as long as they adhered to U.S. safety regulations and insurance requirements.  The United States 
essentially maintained an open trucking policy for Canada and a closed trucking policy for 
Mexico.  In similar fashion, the government of Mexico prevented U.S. trucks from delivering 
cargo into that country. 
 
Although NAFTA was primarily intended to abolish barriers on the trade of goods and services 
between the United States, Mexico, and Canada, it was also intended to open the signatories to 
cross-border trucking competition.  This implies that Mexican trucks and drivers can compete on 
various routes against U.S. trucks and drivers.  To achieve this goal, NAFTA adopted the 
principles of nondiscrimination and Most-Favored-Nation Treatment which mean that the 
contracting parties shall not treat domestic market participants more favorably than foreign 
market participants.  These principles apply to all types of governmental trade obstacles, such as 
border measures and internal regulations (e.g., taxes and product standards). In the case of 
trucking, the principles mean that the United States should hold Canadian and Mexican trucks 
and drivers to the same inspection, safety, and financial standards that apply to its own drivers, 
thus promoting cross-border competition.  Simply put, by removing restrictions on cross border 
trucking operations, NAFTA was supposed to move the signatories to an environment of open 
competition in trucking.  (MacDonald, 2009) 
 
NAFTA established a two-stage schedule that would have opened the United States to cross-
border trucking competition.  In the first stage, which was to begin in 1995, the United States 
would allow Mexican trucks into the four U.S. bordering states--Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, 
and California--and Mexico would allow U.S. trucks into its six border states.  The second stage 
was to begin in 2000, whereupon trucks from the United States would be permitted to travel 
throughout Mexico, and Mexican trucks would be permitted to travel throughout the United 
States. 
 
However, trucks did not cross the borders according to NAFTA’s timeline.  On the day before 
the first stage of the cross-border trucking was to begin, President Bill Clinton placed a 
moratorium that blocked cross-border trucking with Mexico.  Clinton’s official reason was that 
Mexico’s trucks and drivers were not as safe as U.S. trucks and drivers, and additional time was 
necessary to study the situation.  Clinton also expressed concerns about illegal drugs and 
immigrants being transported into the United States by the Mexican trucks.  However, critics felt 
that Clinton’s delay was primarily intended to appease the U.S. trucking industry, notably the 
Teamsters Union (International Brotherhood of Teamsters), which felt threatened about losing 
jobs to lower paid Mexican drivers. 
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The Teamsters Union’s concerns about job losses for its members was supported by data 
showing that Mexican truck drivers on average earn from one third to one half the wages of U.S. 
truck drivers, thus providing Mexican trucking firms a competitive advantage.  However, the 
majority of the cost advantage due to lower wages can be offset on any job without a revenue- 
earning backhaul--the pick up and making a domestic U.S. delivery on the way back to Mexico.  
Also, truck-driver wages in the United States are only about one-half of operating costs.  Other 
factors that work against the lower costs of Mexican trucking firms’ lower wages include: higher 
equipment costs in Mexico; fewer financing options in Mexico; and relatively high maintenance 
costs in Mexico due to poor road conditions.  (Case, 2002) 
 
U.S. policies that have prevented Mexican trucks from delivering cargo to U.S. customers have 
resulted in much frustration for the Mexican government.  The cross-border trucking dispute 
reached a climax in 2009, when Mexico imposed retaliatory tariffs on U.S. imports.  However, in 
March, 2011, the two countries unveiled a deal to resolve this dispute, which could help ease 
tense relations between the two neighbors.  This paper discusses the nature and significance of 
the trucking dispute between Mexico and the United States.   
 
 
2.  The U.S.-Mexican Trucking System   
 
For decades, the safety of the trucking system has been of concern to Americans as well as 
people of other countries.  The United States has laws on its books that limit the number of 
consecutive hours a trucker can be on the road.  We periodically test our drivers for drug or 
alcohol use.  We inspect every vehicle.  We have a computerized database to check the validity 
of licenses and the prior violations of anyone licensed to operate a tractor-trailer.  We require 
thorough training for every U.S. trucker on the road.   
 
When the NAFTA agreement was negotiated, analysts noted that Mexico did not maintain as 
stringent trucking regulations as the United States.  These analysts maintained that Mexican 
drivers were not subject to roadside inspection and drug testing, the requirement of logbooks or 
weighing stations for trucks, mandatory labeling of hazardous or toxic cargo, or a system to 
verify drivers’ licenses.  Also, Mexican trucks were not required to have front brakes and were 
permitted a gross vehicle weight 17,000 pounds heavier than permitted on U.S. roads.   
According to the U.S. Teamsters Union, Mexico’s unsafe trucks and drivers should not be 
allowed to compete with Teamsters Union truckers along the highway trade corridors within the 
United States. 
 
The ratification of NAFTA resulted in the agreement of the United States, Mexico, and Canada  
to open their roads to each other’s trucks according to the time schedule mentioned above.  
Largely because of fears about the safety of Mexican trucks and drivers, in 1995 President Bill 
Clinton delayed the implementation of an open trucking policy by imposing restrictions on 
Mexican trucks, confining them to commercial areas within 25 miles of the Mexican border.  
Mexican goods traveling beyond this zone, deeper into the United States, had to be loaded onto 
American trucks, a practice that pleased the Teamsters Union. 
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Despite bilateral meetings intended to bring Mexican truckers up to U.S. safety requirements, no 
agreement was reached on implementation.  Therefore, Mexico imposed a border ban against 
U.S. truckers: U.S. rigs could cross the Mexican border but could not leave a commercial zone 
that extends no more than 25 miles.  Like Mexican drivers on the other side, American truckers 
drop loads at transfer points, from which Mexican truckers complete the delivery.  
 
In Mexico, as in the United States, two trucking businesses evolved: long-haul companies that 
use newer, better-maintained vehicles, and short-haulers with older fleets that travel just short 
distances.  For example, Mexican products rolling into the United States arrive at a Mexican 
border depot on long-haul trucks.  They are loaded onto short-haulers.  (These go back and forth 
over the border between depots on both sides.)  Finally, an American long-haul trucker takes the 
cargo from the American border depot to its U.S. destination.  This requires three to five trucks 
to cross one line. A similar system applies to the transport of goods from the United States to 
Mexico. Indeed, the movement of goods across the border of the two countries was quite 
inefficient and costly. 
 
Not only was NAFTA intended to yield free trade in goods and services for the signatories, it 
was also meant to decrease transportation costs through competition in trucking.  By allowing 
Mexican long-haul trucks to transport goods directly into the United States (beyond the 25-mile 
commercial zone) and likewise for U.S. long-haul trucks to go deep into Mexico, the need for 
storage and warehousing would decline.  The reduction in short-haul truckers would cut costs to 
shippers and, because they normally do not back haul, the traffic and congestion on the border 
would be reduced due to fewer empty trucks.  Therefore, economic efficiencies created by free 




3.  Arbitration Panel Rules in Favor of Mexico 
 
Despite the advantages of NAFTA, the United States refused to comply with NAFTA’s 
regulations providing an open border policy in ground transportation of goods across the U.S.-
Mexican border.  Mexico’s dissatisfaction regarding this issue resulted in its submission of the 
dispute to the NAFTA resolution panel in the year 2000.  Also, Canada intervened in the conflict 
on behalf of Mexico, maintaining that NAFTA required the equal treatment of foreign and 
domestic truckers.  However, the United States justified its position on the grounds of safety of 
trucks and drivers. 
 
 In 2001, the NAFTA resolution panel unanimously supported Mexico’s position by determining 
that the blanket refusal of the United States to process applications of Mexican truckers for entry 
into the United States was in violation of its NAFTA obligations.  Moreover, the alleged 
shortcomings of Mexico’s regulations of commercial trucking did not free the United States from 
its NAFTA obligations.  However, the panel did determine that the United States could apply 
more stringent standards to Mexican truckers than are applied to U.S. and Canadian truckers, as 
long as the Mexican truckers are reviewed on an individual, case by case basis.  When the 
resolution panel made its ruling, it authorized Mexico to issue retaliatory tariffs against the 
United States if compliance did not take place.  It turned out that Mexico patiently gave the 
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United States eight years to comply with NAFTA before resorting to retaliatory tariffs.     
 
Although President George W. Bush indicated a willingness to comply with NAFTA’s cross-
border provisions, he was opposed by labor and environmental groups who did not want 
Mexican cargo trucks to travel throughout the United States. Also, in 2002 the U.S. Congress 
mandated 22 conditions for opening the border beyond the commercial zone to Mexican cargo 
trucks.  These requirements were in addition to the previous conditions that Mexican truckers 
had to meet for entry into the United States--alcohol and drug tests, hours-of-service limitations 
and logbook rules, insurance requirements, and so on. Examples of these additional requirements 
included: 
 
• All Mexican trucks are subject to U.S. Department of Transportation safety examinations 
before being granted operating authority. 
• Mexican truckers applying to operate beyond the 25 mile commercial zone must have a 
distinctive company identification number. 
• Mexican trucks may enter the United States only where a certified safety inspector is on 
duty. 
• Weigh scales must be installed at the ten highest-volume border crossings. 
• Safety inspectors must verify the validity of the license of each Mexican driver carrying 
hazardous materials, as well as 50 percent of the licenses of all other drivers.   
 
These additional requirements were in excess of the requirements that applied to U.S. and 
Canadian truckers operating in the United States. (Frittelli, 2010) 
 
 
4.  The Cross-Border Demonstration Project 
 
The official reason that the Bush administration did not respond immediately to the 2001 ruling 
of the NAFTA resolution panel was that Congress remained skeptical about the safety of 
Mexican trucks.  However, there also was increasing concern in the United States about drug-
related violence in Mexico and human smuggling along the U.S.-Mexico border.  The Mexican 
government threatened to levy tariffs in retaliation for the prolonged inaction of the Bush 
administration.  Mexico’s President, Vicente Fox, even threatened to totally close the border to 
American cargo trucks. Meanwhile, Mexican trucks were limited to the 25-mile commercial 
zone in U.S. border states, while a similar program existed for U.S. cargo trucks going to 
Mexico.  From 2001 to 2006, Congress passed several pieces of legislation that made NAFTA’s 
cross-border provision unachievable.   
 
In 2007, the Bush Administration announced a pilot program to determine if the NAFTA cross-
border provision would work.  Known as the Demonstration Project, it allowed approved 
Mexican trucks from 100 trucking firms full access to U.S. highways, with a similar program 
allowing U.S. trucks to travel beyond Mexico’s commercial zone.  Although the pilot program 
did not fulfill all of NAFTA’s cross-border trucking provision, which would have allowed all 
Mexican trucks to operate within the United States, it provided a compromise in the heated 
controversy between Mexico and the United States.  During 2007-2009, 29 trucking firms from 
Mexico were granted operating authority throughout the United States.  In total, 103 Mexican 
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cargo trucks were used by these firms as part of the program, and they crossed the border about 
12,500 times to make U.S. deliveries.  During the same period, 10 U.S. trucking firms 
participated in the reciprocal project, and they operated 55 trucks making about 2,200 trips into 
Mexico. 
 
The record of the pilot program provided considerable support for the improving safety of 
Mexico’s trucks and drivers. According to the Secretary of the U.S. Department of 
Transportation, the safety of Mexican trucks had improved from the previous decade and was 
now comparable to U.S. trucks, and Mexican drivers were generally safer than U.S. drivers.  
This conclusion applied to Mexican trucks operating within and beyond the U.S. commercial 
zone. (Peters, 2008)  Also, there was no evidence to suggest that human smuggling or drug 
trafficking activities had increased during the pilot project. 
 
Although only a small number of Mexican trucks entered the United States under the pilot 
program, there was substantial concern about the program and its potential for many additional 
trucks and drivers to be on U.S. highways. Also, the Teamsters Union continued to insist that 
permitting Mexican trucks in the United States would confiscate jobs from U.S. truck drivers.  
Despite the success of the pilot program, in March, 2009 President Barack Obama signed 
legislation that eliminated funding, thus killing the program. All of the progress that the United 
States and Mexico had made on the issue of cross-border trucking came to an abrupt halt, and 
Mexican trucks could no longer travel beyond the commercial zones along the border. Given the 
favorable safety statistics produced by the pilot program, it appears that this unilateral move was 
more politically motivated than safety-minded. 
 
 
5.  United States and Mexico Tentatively Agree to Settle Trucking Dispute 
 
In response to the termination of the pilot program, the Mexican government in March, 2009 
increased tariffs on 89 products, with a value of $2.4 billion, that were imported from the United 
States.  Calibrated to make U.S. products uncompetitive in Mexico’s market, the tariffs ranged 
from 10 to 45 percent and covered a variety of products that included paper, home appliances, 
vegetables, fruit, Christmas trees, suntan lotion, and other consumer goods.  Among the states hit 
hardest by Mexico’s tariffs were California, Oregon, and Washington, which exported these 
products to Mexico.  
 
To add to political pressure, in August, 2010 the Mexican government announced a new list of 
retaliatory tariffs on imports from the United States.  This list added 26 products to, and removed 
16 products from, the original list of 89, bringing the new total to 99 products from 43 states, 
with a total export value of $2.6 billion.  However, the new retaliatory tariffs were less than the 
original tariffs and ranged from 5 to 25 percent. 
 
The effect on U.S. exporters was magnified beyond the retaliatory tariffs themselves because the 
Mexican government randomly rotated the target of the duties.  For instance, one month pork 
bellies would be hard hit, but wine would be adversely taxed the next month.  This random 
application of tariffs across a broad range of U.S. goods made it impossible to make appropriate 
business plans, such as pricing and investment, and the cost to U.S. producers was far greater 
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than the tariffs themselves.  Mexico’s tariff rotation strategy obviously was designed to apply 
maximum pressure on American producers, their powerful lobbies, and also influential 
lawmakers from states seeking a settlement of the trucking conflict. 
 
On a bipartisan basis, members of Congress increasingly complained that Mexico’s retaliatory 
tariffs were having substantial adverse impacts on economies in states like California and on 
local industries, notably agriculture.  For example, it was estimated that U.S. potato exports to 
Mexico had decreased by 50 percent in value since the tariffs had been adopted, and that 
U.S.exporters were losing market share to their Canadian competitors.  (Tsui, 2010)   Clearly, the 
retaliatory tariffs added friction between the Obama administration, seeking to expand trade 
opportunities that would result in increased American jobs, and Congressional Democrats allied 
with unions and independent truck drivers, who supported the trucking restrictions.  Among the 
groups who supported Obama on this issue was a coalition of agriculture and industry interests 
that were led by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. 
 
In March 2011, President Obama and President Felipe Calderon of Mexico unveiled a deal to 
resolve the dispute that kept Mexican trucks off American roads and resulted in billions of 
dollars in tariffs on U.S. exports to Mexico.  Under the plan, in exchange for giving Mexican 
trucks access to U.S. roadways, the Mexican government will eliminate its $2.6 billion in tariffs 
targeted at 99 products.  The first half of the tariffs will be removed after both governments sign 
the agreement.  The remaining tariffs will be eliminated after the first Mexican truck is certified 
under a series of new standards, including English-language, drug, and safety tests, which are 
monitored by the U.S. Department of Transportation.  The proposed project will not be a pilot 
program but an initial stage that will include several thousand trucks and eventually bring as 
many vehicles as needed into the United States. 
 
The proposed requirements for Mexican trucks are more stringent than those previously 
established in NAFTA and somewhat tougher than those currently in force for American 
truckers.  For example, Mexican trucks will have to carry electronic recorders to ensure that they 
make only cargo trips across the border and to track compliance with U.S. hours-of-service laws.  
This means that Mexican trucks will be prohibited from hauling freight between destinations 
within the United States.  The agreement, by simplifying the border crossing process, would 
boost Mexico’s ability to compete in international trade by decreasing transport costs. The 
Obama-Calderon agreement is subject to ratification by the governments of Mexico and the 
United States, which could occur later in 2011. 
 
The American Trucking Association praised the announcement, saying it will promote two-way 
trade between the United States and Mexico. However, the Teamsters Union and certain trucking 
companies oppose the deal, saying it sacrifices American jobs when unemployment is high so 
that big business can save money partly by hiring cheaper drivers. 
  
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
Whether or not the United States should fulfill its NAFTA commitment and allow Mexican 
cargo trucks to travel throughout the United States is a controversial issue.  On one hand, free 
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traders have favored an open transportation policy on the grounds that it will lead to greater 
economic efficiency and benefits to consumers in the form of lower prices.  They also note that 
the world opinion of the United States has deteriorated as the U.S. has maintained its refusal to 
grant access to Mexican cargo trucks.  However, the Teamsters and other unions have officially 
opposed an open transportation policy on the grounds of truck safety, although job preservation 
for their members appears to be an important part of their motivation.   
 
Indeed, strong political forces have served as a barrier to an open trucking policy.  During his 
campaign for the presidency, Barack Obama maintained that an open transportation policy 
should not be applied to Mexican drivers and that the United States should renegotiate NAFTA.  
Since Obama became president, he has slowly moved in the direction of granting access to 
Mexican truckers, as seen in his March, 2011 announcement of a trucking deal with Mexico.  
Nevertheless, a skeptical Congress has dragged its feet on forming free trade and transportation 
deals not only with Mexico, but with other countries such as South Korea and Colombia.  At the 
writing of this paper, it remains to be seen if President Obama can convince Congress to ratify 
his trucking deal with Mexico. 
 
What will be the effects for commercial trucking under the Obama-Calderon deal?  It is likely 
that the opening of the Mexico-U.S. border will be based on gradualism, and therefore the effects 
will be modest.  That is, there will not be an immediate surge of U.S. long-haul trucks into 
Mexico during the first several years after enactment, nor a surge of Mexican long-haul trucks 
into the United States (Fritelli, 2010).  Why is this so? 
 
Mexican cargo trucks operating in the United States will continue to encounter several 
disadvantages. Increased border delays since the September 11 terrorist attack against the United 
States have added to the time that Mexican trucks and drivers are not operating, resulting in 
increased costs that burden long-haul cargo companies and discourage them from making 
commitments to trade with the United States.  Moreover, Mexican trucks will be handicapped by 
relatively high costs of insurance, an English language requirement that restricts the number of 
Mexican trucks that can operate legally in the United States, and relatively higher interest rates 
due to less access to financial resources than their American competitors.  
 
Another disadvantage to Mexican trucking companies operating in the United States is that the 
profitability of trucking declines with an increase in the distance that empty trailers are hauled.   
For a Mexican trucking company, lower wages of Mexican drivers increase its competitiveness.  
However, this advantage can be significantly offset by the lack of a revenue-earning backhaul, 
since it is illegal for a Mexican truck to pick up and make a domestic U.S. delivery on the way 
back to Mexico.  Therefore, it is likely that only the U.S.-Mexico border states will initially serve 
as the major zone of competition; that is, only a few Mexican trucking firms that develop 
business relationships with American customers will be able to benefit from backhaul loads from 
deep in the United States to Mexico.     
 
The likelihood of substantial numbers of U.S. trucking companies’ immediately providing cargo 
service deep into Mexico also appears to be low.  Once an American truck and driver enter 
Mexico, they encounter a labor cost disadvantage relative to their Mexican competitors.  Also, 
many U.S. drivers do not speak fluent Spanish, and they may also believe that Mexico is 
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becoming an increasingly dangerous place to operate, in view of the violence of Mexican drug 
cartels.  These factors will continue to discourage long-haul U.S. cargo truckers from traveling 
very far into Mexico.  Most of the access will likely be near the border, where Mexican trucking 
firms will face increasing competition from American companies serving the industrial parks’ 
(maquiladora) trade.  
 
Over the longer run, the ability of Mexican truck companies to extend their range into the United 
States, or U.S. trucking companies to penetrate Mexico, will become less dependent on 
government rules applied to commercial activities and more dependent on the economics of 
global trucking.  The major determinant of the growth of border truck crossings has been the 
growth in trade between the two countries, which determines the amount of freight that must be 
transported across the border.  It is unlikely that the Obama-Calderon plan to open transportation 
networks will, by itself, result in a substantial increase in the amount of cargo transported across 
the border. 
 
The economic relationship with Mexico is strategic to the United States because of the 
implications it has for bilateral trade, economic conditions in both countries, economic 
competitiveness, and border security.  President Calderon and President Obama have reaffirmed 
their shared values and the need for increased cooperation in North America to promote 
economic growth and competitiveness.  If the United States is to deepen economic integration 
with Mexico, it is necessary that the long-standing trucking dispute between these countries be 
put to an end.                   
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